This note uses an analysis of Broussais's objection to medical ontology to suggest why Broussais's neologism οντοι is derived not from οντα but from a conflation of οντα and the plural of ογκος. For Broussais medical ontology, in contrast to philosophical ontology, always refers to abstract entities alleged to explain sensible symptoms, ογκοι, in the sense of indivisible particles in the writings of Lucretius and Epicurus, are such particles; οντα are not.

The doctrine of double effect shows that for which the moral agent is responsible, by explicating the relationship between the act directly intended and the consequences of that act. I contend that this doctrine is necessary not only for natural law absolutism, but also for Donagan's Kantianism and for Quinn's revised construal of the doctrine, and even for consequentialism, as bioethical implications of the doctrine make clear. For those who do not accept this necessity, I contend that it is necessary (...) metatheoretically, in order to deal with those moral agents with irreconcilably different notions of the morally good. (shrink)